發(fā)布時間：2021-03-21
業(yè)精于勤，行成于思。2021年1月14日，在職博士企業(yè)家學者項目首二班同學、中電產(chǎn)融控股公司董事長、大唐金融控股集團董事長任慧勇迎來了他的畢業(yè)論文答辯時刻。他圍繞主題《論中國現(xiàn)階段混合所有制產(chǎn)權(quán)改革激勵機制對公司業(yè)績的影響》進行了深入分析，現(xiàn)場的精彩闡述讓人印象深刻，最終順利通過答辯。恭喜任慧勇同學！讓我們一起回顧他的答辯風采。
在職博士企業(yè)家學者項目以成就新商業(yè)文明思想者和引領(lǐng)者為愿景，整合全球優(yōu)質(zhì)教育資源，打造極具前沿性和系統(tǒng)性課程，在行業(yè)內(nèi)引領(lǐng)、在細分領(lǐng)域獨樹一幟的精英群體提供持續(xù)系統(tǒng)的終身學習平臺，實現(xiàn)“理解-判斷-實踐-引領(lǐng)”的跨越式發(fā)展，任慧勇同學在系統(tǒng)、深刻的框架思考和跨界思維的學習中，洞察行業(yè)大勢與規(guī)律，站在商業(yè)、信息、理念、觀點、方法的最前沿，共同迎接新商業(yè)文明的機遇與挑戰(zhàn)，不斷地提高拓進、蛻變成長、不忘初心、探索真知。
本次論文答辯，來自新加坡管理大學（SMU）的教授們共同見證了任慧勇同學的學術(shù)成果。
任慧勇： 論中國現(xiàn)階段混合所有制產(chǎn)權(quán)改革激勵機制對公司業(yè)績的影響
任慧勇同學答辯中
▇ 論文摘要：
自2017年年初，中央經(jīng)濟工作會議將混合所有制改革定調(diào)為國企改革突破口以來，從央企到地方國有企業(yè)，都在不斷推出涉及混合制改革的新舉措、新部署。混合所有制改革（以下簡稱“混改”）將民企靈活的市場應(yīng)對機制和創(chuàng)新的管理體制引入到國企內(nèi)，來提升國企的市場意識，增加自身競爭力、活力及創(chuàng)新力，從而為企業(yè)打造一個符合現(xiàn)代化企業(yè)治理的體系，能更從容地應(yīng)對市場的變化。當前，國企混改已取得了初步成效，混改企業(yè)數(shù)量逐漸增多，但仍有不少企業(yè)處于觀望狀態(tài)，真正完成混改的企業(yè)并不多。此外，雖然政府部門已經(jīng)公布了混合所有制改革的頂層設(shè)計方案，然而并沒有現(xiàn)成的操作體系可以借鑒，所以有必要從實踐案例出發(fā)對企業(yè)混改進行相關(guān)研究，探索混改的可操作路徑，為其他混改企業(yè)提供借鑒作用。
混合所有制改革是一項涉及產(chǎn)權(quán)制度的深度改革，其落腳點不僅停留在對所有權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的改變上，還著眼于體制機制改革。在混改過程中，企業(yè)依據(jù)不同的市場和治理目標，選擇不同的混改路徑，設(shè)計不同的激勵機制，進而對企業(yè)績效產(chǎn)生影響，革新后的激勵機制配置是企業(yè)改革能否取得預(yù)期成效的關(guān)鍵。基于此，本文重點關(guān)注的問題是國有企業(yè)混合所有制改革背景下企業(yè)激勵機制革新與企業(yè)績效的關(guān)系，以混改企業(yè)的激勵機制為研究目標，選取云南白藥和綠地集團為具體分析案例，從企業(yè)內(nèi)外部環(huán)境出發(fā)，逐步分析它們的混改動因與路徑，具體分析案例企業(yè)在混改背景下，激勵機制調(diào)整與企業(yè)績效的關(guān)系，最后提出當前國企混改實踐中激勵機制存在的問題以及改進建議。
本文在產(chǎn)權(quán)理論、委托代理理論和激勵理論的基礎(chǔ)上，通過對高管經(jīng)理人需求、人性假設(shè)與行為分析構(gòu)建出激勵的基本理論框架，對當前國有企業(yè)混合所有制改革實踐中面臨的問題對激勵要素的影響進行了重點結(jié)構(gòu)剖析，并對激勵體系進行了實證檢驗與案例分析。在核心要素分析上，本文以最優(yōu)薪酬體系為切入點，選擇薪酬激勵、股權(quán)激勵、精神激勵等要點對照分析，同時從“一層三會”治理結(jié)構(gòu)、黨組織監(jiān)督的懲戒機制、市場化經(jīng)理人選聘等結(jié)合中國特色的管理制度作為補充和保障，試圖構(gòu)建一個混合產(chǎn)權(quán)改革背景下完善的激勵體系，并能夠?qū)嶋H應(yīng)用。
答辯現(xiàn)場
通過研究，本文得出如下結(jié)論：
第一，増資擴股是國有企業(yè)混合所有制改革新的突破口。通過增量模式對國有企業(yè)推動混合所有制改革，有助于擴充企業(yè)資本（做大）、増強企業(yè)活力（做強），尤其是有力地促進國有企業(yè)位于混合所有制發(fā)展期間的治理效率，形成的共贏局面。
第二，股權(quán)激勵已成為公司績效的普遍激勵模式。在股權(quán)虛擬模式激勵下，高管經(jīng)理人享受一定數(shù)量的分紅和股價升值收益權(quán)，但不稀釋國有控股地位對股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)不產(chǎn)生影響。同時，即時的收益權(quán)會對經(jīng)理人形成有效激勵，繼而影響當期的企業(yè)利潤。
第三，民企身份轉(zhuǎn)換是有效的轉(zhuǎn)崗?fù)ǖ?，比國企任留更能促進激勵。國有企業(yè)混合所有制改革所需的高管轉(zhuǎn)崗?fù)ǖ腊ㄓ尚姓蚊脑瓏衅髽I(yè)經(jīng)營管理者通過任留身份轉(zhuǎn)化而來、通過市場化選聘的方式獲取外部職業(yè)經(jīng)理人、民營企業(yè)家身份的轉(zhuǎn)化。
第四，構(gòu)建事業(yè)合伙人分享機制比績效分配更能有效實現(xiàn)激勵。國有企業(yè)混合所有制改革必須在人才管理方面進行創(chuàng)新，重新界定經(jīng)理人與企業(yè)的關(guān)系，將員工看作企業(yè)的“人力資本合伙人”，打破原有的雇傭關(guān)系，將管理者轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)槠髽I(yè)的所有者，職業(yè)經(jīng)理人轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)橹魅宋?，讓員工分享企業(yè)發(fā)展所帶來的財富。
本文的創(chuàng)新點在于從公司治理的角度采用多案例研究國有企業(yè)混合所有制改革問題。目前國內(nèi)大多數(shù)文獻是從單一的股權(quán)層面或單一案例層面的改革路徑進行論述，成系統(tǒng)的針對激勵機制的分析較少。本文作者將觀點由點串成線，再擴展為面，全面而清晰的分析研究中國國有企業(yè)混合所有制改革會面臨的阻礙，并提出適用的解決方法，為國企混改搭建合理的路徑。由此，本文主要有兩方面的貢獻：在理論方面，探究了產(chǎn)權(quán)改革對企業(yè)績效提升的內(nèi)在機理，從產(chǎn)權(quán)改革的激勵機制角度研究企業(yè)績效提升機制，豐富激勵機制的多維理論研究。通過對中國混改模式的委托代理體系進行剖析，將其與產(chǎn)權(quán)改革的激勵機制銜接，推演產(chǎn)權(quán)改革對企業(yè)績效提升的內(nèi)在機理，研究產(chǎn)權(quán)改革的激勵機制和企業(yè)績效提升的關(guān)系，運用解構(gòu)分析的方法探尋企業(yè)績效提升的關(guān)鍵機制。在實踐方面，本研究一方面為國有企業(yè)混合所有制改革路徑提供理論指導(dǎo)，另一方面，為國有企業(yè)混合所有制改革政策制定提供案例參考。
答辯現(xiàn)場
▇ ABSTRACT：
Since the Central Economic Work Conference set the mixed ownership reform as where China’s state-owned enterprises (SOE) can make breakthroughs on reforms in early 2017, enterprises at all levels, from central to local state-owned, have continuously introduced new measures and new deployments involving the reform. The mixed ownership reform (hereinafter referred to as the "mixed reform") introduces flexible market response mechanisms and innovative management systems from private enterprises into state-owned enterprises to enhance the market awareness of state-owned enterprises, to increase their own competitiveness, vitality and creativity. It aims to build a system that conforms to modern corporate governance and better responds to market changes. At present, the mixed reform of state-owned enterprises has achieved initial results. In spite of a gradual increase in the number of enterprises, quite a few are still in a wait-and-see situation. Only a few have actually completed the mixed reform. In addition, although government departments have announced the top-level design plan for the mixed ownership reform, there is no ready-made operating system to borrow experience from. Therefore, it is necessary to conduct research on the mixed-ownership reform from practical cases and explore its feasible paths to provide reference for other enterprises.
The mixed ownership reform is a comprehensive reform involving property rights, rooted in not only changes to the ownership structure, but also system and mechanism revolutions. In the course of reform, enterprises take different paths and design various incentive mechanisms to suit different markets and governance objectives, which in turn will have an impact on corporate performance. The configuration of incentive mechanisms after the reform comes as the key to assessing whether the reform achieves expected results. On this basis, the paper focuses on the relationship between innovating incentive mechanisms and enterprise performance in the context of the mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises and sets the goal of research at incentive mechanisms for mixed-reform enterprises. In the case study of Yunnan Baiyao and Greenland Holdings Corp., Ltd., the paper starts with the internal and external environment of enterprises to analyze the causes and paths of their mixed reforms, examines the relationship between incentive mechanism adjustments and corporate performance in the two companies, reveals the problems existing in incentive mechanisms in the course of practicing the reform, and puts forward suggestions for improvement.
任慧勇同學在企業(yè)家學者項目
On the basis of the property rights theory, the principal-agent theory and the incentive mechanism theory, the author builds the basic theoretical and practical framework for incentives through analyzing the needs of senior managers, human nature assumptions and behaviors, expounds the impact of the problems occurring in the current mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises on incentive elements, and carries out empirical examination and case analysis of incentive mechanisms. For the analysis of core elements, this paper sees the optimal salary system as an entry point and compares such key points as salary incentives, equity incentives, and spiritual incentives. It also tries to construct a complete and practice-oriented incentive system against the background of the mixed property rights reform, supplemented by management systems with Chinese characteristics, including the governance structure of "three meetings and one layer", the disciplinary mechanism of party organization supervision, and the market-oriented recruitment of managers.
Our work has led us to four conclusions as follows. Firstly, increasing capital and shares should be a new breakthrough in the mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises, by which corporate capital can be expanded (to make a larger company) and corporate vitality strengthened (to make a stronger company). In particular, it can effectively promote the governance efficiency of state-owned enterprises during the mixed ownership and formulate a win-win situation. Secondly, equity incentives have become a common model to drive company performance. Under the incentive model of virtual equity, senior managers can enjoy certain dividends and the rights of share price appreciation without weakening the state-owned holding status or impairing the equity structure. Meanwhile, immediate right to earnings will work as an effective incentive for managers and in turn affect current corporate profits. Thirdly, status conversion to private enterprises is an effective channel for job transfer and a more appealing incentive than retention in state-owned enterprises. The channels for executive transfer for the mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises include the tenure transfer of former state-owned enterprise managers appointed by administration, the market-based recruitment and hiring of external professional managers, and the identity transfer of private entrepreneurs. Fourthly, building a business partner sharing mechanism is a more productive incentive than performance distribution. The mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises must bring creative changes to talent management, redefine the relationship between managers and enterprises, treat employees as the “partners of human capital” to break away from the original employment relationship, and turn the management into the owner of an enterprise and professional managers into the s, thus enabling employees to share the wealth brought by corporate development.
任慧勇同學在企業(yè)家學者項目
The highlight of this paper rests on the study of problems related to the mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises from the perspective of corporate governance through multiple cases. At present, most domestic literature discusses the reform paths from the level of a single equity or case. Few researchers have addressed incentive mechanisms in a systematic way. In the course of analysis, the author fans out from point to area, analyzes the obstacles to the mixed ownership reform of China’s state-owned enterprises in a comprehensive, clear pattern, and proposes applicable solutions to paint a reasonable roadmap for the reform. Therefore, the value of our contribution lies in two aspects. In terms of theory, it explores the internal mechanism that explains how the property rights reform contributes to corporate performance from the angle of incentive mechanisms and enriches multi-dimensional theoretical research on incentive mechanisms. Supported by the analysis of the principal-agent system in the mixed ownership reform, this paper connects the system with the incentive mechanism of the property rights reform, deduces the internal mechanism of the property rights reform that works on corporate performance improvement, studies the relationship between incentive mechanisms and the improvement of corporate performance, and investigates the key mechanism that enhances corporate performance via deconstruction analysis. With respect to practice, our research aims to provide state-owned enterprises with theoretical guidance on the paths of the mixed ownership reform and offer insights into the formulation of policies for the mixed reform.
范昕宇教授代表許成鋼教授參加了本次現(xiàn)場答辯
論文答辯圓滿結(jié)束，但對于任慧勇同學來說，這是一個新的開始。作為一名新商業(yè)文明的先行者和探索者，在自己的工作實踐中親身體驗，并在企業(yè)家學者項目的課程學習中洗禮蛻變，帶著探索的熱情與勇氣一步步走來，最終順利通過答辯，相信在今后的日子里，任慧勇同學的灼見與智慧，將會對整個行業(yè)的發(fā)展不斷推進助力。
